

~~TOP SECRET~~HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLYRECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE INFORMATION POLICY

- 1947 - National Security Act of 1947 - DCI responsible for protection of intelligence sources and methods. TAB 1
- 1956 - June 20 - First U-2 overflight of Soviet Union. President directed special security compartment - TALENT system.
- July 11 - First Soviet protest to State Department.
- 1960 - January 11 - Gen White - "SAMOS is a reconnaissance satellite..."
- February 5 - Gen Schriever testifies before Congress on SAMOS.
- May 1 - U-2 shot down. Publicly acknowledged and suspended.
- August 19 - First satellite photography recovered.
- August 26 - President directed TALENT-KEYHOLE system
- covered product and fact of
- reiterated DCI responsibility. TAB 2
- Soviets openly protested satellite reconnaissance was illegal espionage; violated sovereign rights.
- 1962 - March - Blagonravov to Dryden: "...each side declare it would not use reconnaissance satellites for military purposes over territory of other."
- March - DOD Directive S5200.13, Security Policy for Space Programs published. TAB 3
- April - Soviets launch first reconnaissance satellite, PHOTO/ELINT, from TTMTIC.
- May 26 - NSAM 156 issued to formulate position on satellite reconnaissance. TAB 4
- July 10 - President approved NSCA 2454. TAB 5

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- 1963 - January 18 - NSAM 156 Committee met pursuant to NSAM 216
- disclosure to Soviets at high level, or
 - material in hands of U.S. Ambassador. TAB 6
- February 26 - Recommendation against disclosure.
- September - AF Regulation 205-23 published, Special Security Procedures for Military Space Programs. TAB 7
- December 20 - NSAM 156 Committee met to consider disclosure in relationship to disarmament. TAB 8
- 1964 - January 21 - NSAM 156 Committee recommended against additional dissemination.
- June 6 - NSAM 156 Committee met to discuss question of approaching Khrushchev following visits of Drew Pearson and William Benton
- several meetings followed
 - Soviet question dropped
 - briefings to other heads of state proposed.
- October - November - Heads of NATO and others briefed
- "fact of" and value of U.S. program
 - Soviet capabilities. TAB 9
- 1966 - May 27 - Walt Rostow urged President to approach Moscow for joint release to U.N. on space reconnaissance. TAB 10
- June 24 - State response: not desirable to disclose publicly or to the Soviets.
- 1967 - July 20 - Secretary of Defense voted against disclosure. TAB 11
- 1968 - September 16 - NSAM 156 Committee met to discuss State/ACDA paper, Disarmament Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy
- SALT delegates use "information-gathering satellites"
 - establish non-interference principle
 - discussed case for disclosure.

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- 1969 - May 14 - NSSM 28 Steering Committee
- acted on the State/ACDA 1968 paper
 - enjoined Delegation from discussing effectiveness.
- 1971 - September - NSAM 156 Committee asked to look at acknowledgement of "national technical means of verification" before Congress
- referred to Verification Panel. TAB 12
- 1972 - June 16 - DCI reiterated responsibilities for BYEMAN and TALENT-KEYHOLE controls. TAB 13
- June 17 - White House declared the "fact of" the type of verification system would not be disclosed. TAB 14
- 1973 - The situation today --
- We are heavily dependent upon satellite reconnaissance; no viable alternative exists.
 - Satellites are fragile and vulnerable and require a permissive environment to operate.
 - The decision to disclose is irreversible.
 - "Everybody knows", so there is little point in disclosing the "fact of".
 - public reaction is not adverse
 - public knowledge is neither complete nor accurate
 - "Facts about" are very sensitive --
 - how good we are
 - how dependent we are on satellite reconnaissance
 - what we are not collecting
 - some missions are more sensitive than others. TAB 15
 - CIA involvement in the NRP is very sensitive.

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- Sanitization provides data to analysts while protecting sensitive sources
- USIB approval to provide certain satellite SIGINT data as SECRET NOFORN
- Over 370,000 frames of satellite photography sanitized in last five years
- Next generation system, KENNEN, needs to be protected because of significantly greater capabilities
- Reaction to NASA Earth Resources Survey Program is not all favorable
- Mendeleovich comments at U.N. in 1969. TAB 16
- Comments by other countries at U.N. TAB 17
- Acceptance is tacit; decision to disclose should --
- consider effect on our Allies
- consider acknowledgement of Soviet capabilities

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